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[DM/PCI] Validate ivshmem shared memory window - #11993

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BernardXiong:fix/ivshmem-shmem-window-validation
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BernardXiong wants to merge 1 commit into
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BernardXiong:fix/ivshmem-shmem-window-validation

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Summary

When BAR2 is absent, ivshmem_pci_probe() takes the JailHouse fallback and copies the shared memory address and size from the device-controlled PCI config words at 0x40..0x4f. The PCI core never validates these values, and rt_ioremap() maps whatever physical range it is given. A malicious or ill-formatted ivshmem device can therefore make the kernel map an arbitrary physical window (for example kernel RAM) and expose it to user space through /dev/ivshmemN, giving unprivileged processes arbitrary kernel memory read/write.

Changes

  • Only use the config space fallback when the new RT_IVSHMEM_JAILHOUSE option is enabled. It defaults to n, and its help text documents that the device must be trusted. Without it, a valid BAR2 is required.
  • Validate the window before rt_ioremap(): non-zero size, no address overflow, and the whole range must be representable with native pointer/size types.
  • Read the four config words into 64-bit locals instead of writing through 32-bit aliases of the shmem and shmem_size fields (which also corrupted adjacent fields on 32-bit builds).
  • Check the return value of the config space reads.

Fixes #11992

Testing

Changed files pass clang-format 22.1.8. The ivshmem driver compiles in both configurations (RT_IVSHMEM_JAILHOUSE=n and =y) for bsp/qemu-virt64-aarch64 with RT_USING_PCI, RT_PCI_MSI and RT_USING_IVSHMEM enabled. CI will confirm the full build.

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github-actions Bot commented Nov 5, 2026

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👋 感谢您对 RT-Thread 的贡献!Thank you for your contribution to RT-Thread!

为确保代码符合 RT-Thread 的编码规范,请在你的仓库中执行以下步骤运行代码格式化工作流(如果格式化CI运行失败)。
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github-actions Bot commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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📌 Code Review Assignment

🏷️ Tag: components

Reviewers: @Maihuanyi

Changed Files (Click to expand)
  • components/drivers/ivshmem/Kconfig
  • components/drivers/ivshmem/ivshmem.c

📊 Current Review Status (Last Updated: 2026-11-07 00:06 CST)


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@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Nov 5, 2026 •

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The shared memory address and size in the ivshmem PCI config space
(0x40..0x4f) are controlled by the device. ivshmem_pci_probe() used them
verbatim as a JailHouse fallback when BAR2 was absent, so a malicious
device could make the kernel map an arbitrary physical window and expose
it to user space through /dev/ivshmemN.

Only use the config space fallback when RT_IVSHMEM_JAILHOUSE is enabled,
and validate the window (non-zero size, no overflow and representable by
native pointer and size types) before mapping. Read the four config words
into 64-bit locals instead of writing through 32-bit aliases of the
pointer and size fields, and check the config space read result.

Fixes RT-Thread#11992
@BernardXiong
BernardXiong force-pushed the fix/ivshmem-shmem-window-validation branch from 0bc5e16 to 6bee4a6 Compare November 6, 2026 16:06

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