Secure-RADS is a research proof of concept. It is not hardened for production use, and no security guarantee is offered. Deploying it with real personal data is out of scope.
Do not open a public issue.
Email [email protected] with:
- the affected component (registry-service, sce-unit, verifier-service, pdm-service, execution service, or the AWS templates)
- a description of the issue and its impact
- reproduction steps or a proof of concept
- the commit you tested
If the report involves a credential, revoke it first; do not send the secret itself.
- Attestation bypass: an enclave or process that should fail verification and does not.
- Trust boundary breaks: the Data Controller app reaching data outside its
RECORDS_PATH, or reading decrypted records after the run. - Enclave escape or unintended host access from
sce-unitor the jailed app. - Secret exposure in the repository or in build artifacts.
- IAM or resource policies that grant more than the documented flow requires.
- Findings that require control of the AWS account or the build host.
- Denial of service against your own deployment.
- Missing hardening already tracked as an open issue.
- Reports from automated scanners with no demonstrated impact.
Reports are acknowledged on a best-effort basis; this is a research project and there is no
service-level agreement or bounty. Fixes land in main and are noted in the release notes when a
release is cut. Please allow time for a fix before public disclosure.